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In daily life (e.g., in the work environment) people are often distracted by stimuli that are clearly
irrelevant to the current task and should be ignored. In contrast, much applied distraction research has
focused on task interruptions by information that requires a response and therefore cannot be ignored.
Moreover, the most commonly used laboratory measures of distractibility (e.g., in the response-
competition and attentional-capture paradigms), typically involve distractors that are task relevant (e.g.,
through response associations or location). A series of experiments assessed interference effects from
stimuli that are entirely unrelated to the current task, comparing the effects of perceptual load on
task-irrelevant and task-relevant (response competing) distractors. The results showed that an entirely
irrelevant distractor can interfere with task performance to the same extent as a response-competing
distractor and that, as with other types of distractors, the interfering effects of the irrelevant distractors
can be eliminated with high perceptual load in the relevant task. These findings establish a new laboratory
measure of a form of distractibility common to everyday life and highlight load as an important
determinant of such distractibility.
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Being distracted in daily life can interrupt task performance and
have a variety of negative consequences. A good illustration of this
can be found in research highlighting the many disadvantages
experienced by highly distractible individuals: Not only do they
show poorer academic performance as schoolchildren (Rabiner,
Murray, Schmid, & Malone, 2004) and reduced efficiency in the
workplace as adults (J. C. Wallace & Vodanovich, 2003), but they
also have increased risk of both minor (e.g., losing work while
computing, Jones & Martin, 2003) and more serious accidents
(e.g., car accidents or serious falls, Arthur & Doverspike, 1992;
Larson, Alderton, Neideffer, & Underhill, 1997; Larson & Merritt,
1991). A valuable application of attention research would therefore
be to predict the type of stimuli that are likely to distract perfor-
mance even when completely irrelevant to the task at hand and
characterize the type of tasks that are more vulnerable or more
immune to distraction. In this way attention research can identify
potential ways of avoiding the interfering effects of irrelevant
distractions.
However, despite much previous work on attention and distrac-
tion, the form of distraction by stimuli that are entirely irrelevant
to the task at hand has been rather understudied. Such irrelevant
distractions seem common to daily life and the work environment.
For example, in work environments one may be distracted by
irrelevant noise or by the actions of a colleague nearby. During
driving, one may be distracted from focusing on the road ahead by
a colorful roadside billboard, despite the billboard appearing in a
location to which the driver has no reason to attend, and being
entirely unrelated to the task of driving. Indeed, such distractions
can be associated with serious negative outcomes. For example,
electrical workers that report being more distracted in daily life are
more likely to suffer from accidents at work (Wallace & Vodanov-
ich, 2003). Increased rates of car accidents have been associated
with sections of road with greater numbers of roadside billboards
(see B. Wallace, 2003, for review), and a recent study (McEvoy,
Stevenson, & Woodward, 2007) found that over 10% of a sample
of 1,367 drivers hospitalized following a car accident reported
having been distracted at the time of the crash by seemingly
task-irrelevant factors such as the sight of a person, event, or object
outside of the car or an animal or insect inside the car.
Much applied research into distraction has focused on
secondary-task interference, whereby distracting effects result
from deliberately dividing attention between two or more tasks
(e.g., having a mobile phone conversation while driving; Strayer &
Drews, 2007). As attention is deliberately allocated to the source
of distraction in order to perform the secondary task, however, this
research does not address the issue of interference from any form
of irrelevant distractors that should be ignored, such as those in the
aforementioned examples of driving or the work environment.
Another area of applied research that that bears on the issue of
distraction has examined task interruptions and their management
(e.g., a pilot may be interrupted from ongoing tasks by instructions
of air-traffic control) in a wide range of work environments such
as air-traffic control, driving, and computing (see Gillie & Broad-
bent, 1989; Hodgetts & Jones, 2006; Jackson, Dawson, & Wilson,
2003; Latorella, 1998; McFarlane & Latorella, 2002; Noy, Le-
moine, Klachan, & Burns, 2004; Trafton, Altmann, Brock, &
Mintz, 2003). However, the task interruptions in this research are
not made by stimuli that are clearly task irrelevant. In fact, the task
Sophie Forster and Nilli Lavie, Department of Psychology, University
College London, United Kingdom.
This research was supported by a Wellcome Trust Award to Nilli Lavie.
We thank Anja Hayen for her assistance in data collection.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Sophie
Forster, Department of Psychology, University College London, Gower
Street, London WC1E 6BT, United Kingdom. E-mail: s.forster@ucl.ac.uk
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 14, No. 1, 73–83 1076-898X/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/1076-898X.14.1.73
73
This article, manuscript, or document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association (APA). For non-commercial, education and research purposes, users may access, download,
copy, display, and redistribute this article or manuscript as well as adapt, translate, or data and text mine the content contained in this document. For any such use of this document, appropriate
attribution or bibliographic citation must be given. Users should not delete any copyright notices or disclaimers. For more information or to obtain permission beyond that granted here, visit
http://www.apa.org/about/copyright.html.interruptions examined were those that force the person to allocate
some attention to the source of interruption, in order to either make
a response or determine whether or not to respond (e.g., a pilot
may have to respond to the air-traffic controller).
Thus, like the secondary-task interference research the
interruption-management research also cannot tell us about the
determinants of the ability to ignore distractors that are clearly
irrelevant to the current task—in fact, ignoring the interrupting
information in these tasks would be at least in some cases contrary
to the participant’s goals. In contrast, the issue of irrelevant dis-
tractions concerns the ability to avoid any interruption by a poten-
tially distracting stimulus that is clearly task irrelevant.
The effects of irrelevant distraction have been more directly
addressed in research into the effects of irrelevant noise on task
performance (see Broadbent, 1979; Smith, 1990 for review). This
research has revealed valuable information about the characteris-
tics of noises that are more distracting (e.g., a change in the level
of noise, even from louder to more quiet, is in many cases more
distracting than continuous noise, Teichner, Arees, & Reilly, 1963)
and those that in fact produce some alerting effects and thus
facilitate rather than hinder performance. However, both the mag-
nitude and the direction (whether interfering or facilitating) of
effects of noise on performance appear to be highly task dependent
(e.g., negative effects of moderate noise have often tended to be
found on tasks with a high cognitive load, whereas no effects or
even facilitatory effects have been reported on certain other tasks,
e.g., involving physical strength; see Smith, 1990, for discussion of
this issue) and in many cases these effects could reflect other
processes than the distraction of attention (e.g., increased level of
arousal). It is therefore unclear to what extent one can draw any
general conclusions about attention and the ability to ignore irrel-
evant distractions (including those by visual stimuli) from the
research examining the effects of noise.
Laboratory attention research examining the issue of interfer-
ence from distractors to which no response is required has never-
theless been limited to cases of distractors that have in fact been
relevant to the task in one sense or another. To illustrate this point,
consider the two main distractor paradigms that have been widely
used to address the effects of irrelevant distractors on attention: the
flanker task (and its variations, e.g., in the study of negative
priming) and the singleton attention capture task.
In a typical flanker task participants make speeded choice re-
sponses between different target stimuli (e.g., press one key to
indicate that the target letter X appeared and another to indicate
that a target letter N appeared) while attempting to ignore an
irrelevant-distractor stimulus. Distractor processing is assessed by
comparing target response times (RTs) in the presence of distractor
stimuli that are either associated with the current target responses
(e.g., distractor X, for a target X: a compatible distractor condi-
tion), associated with the alternative target response (e.g., distrac-
tor N for a target X: an incompatible distractor condition), or not
associated with any of the target responses (a neutral distractor
condition). Distractor compatibility effects on target RTs, namely,
the slowing of target RTs in the presence of response-incompatible
versus response-compatible or neutral distractor conditions, indi-
cate that participants have failed to ignore the irrelevant distractor.
The distractor is considered irrelevant in this paradigm because it
is presented in an irrelevant location, typically in the periphery,
where the target is never presented, whereas the target is typically
presented at the display center (though see Beck & Lavie, 2005,
for the effects of distractors when presented at fixation with the
task-relevant stimuli presented at the periphery).
However, although the distractor location is irrelevant, its iden-
tity is highly relevant to the task as it is associated with one of the
target responses. This paradigm is therefore limited with respect to
addressing determinants of distraction by stimuli that are entirely
irrelevant, namely, not only presented in irrelevant positions but
also not being associated with any of the target responses.
Another popular distractor paradigm is that of “attentional cap-
ture.” In this paradigm participants typically perform a visual
search task, for example, search for a prespecified target letter
(Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Yantis & Jonides, 1990) or shape
(Theeuwes, 1992, 1994). One of the search nontarget stimuli
carries a unique “singleton” feature (e.g., is the only red among
otherwise all-green items in the letter or shape search tasks de-
scribed above). The processing of this distractor and the extent to
which it is thought to have captured attention is assessed by
measuring search RTs in the presence compared to the absence of
this singleton distractor. Importantly, although the attentional-
capture effects are often larger when the singleton feature is in
some sense relevant to the target search (Folk & Remington, 1998,
1999; Johnson, Hutchison, & Neill, 2001) attention-capture effects
can found even when the distractor singleton feature appears to be
irrelevant to the search task (such as is the case for a color
singleton distractor presented during a shape- or letter-based
search in the example mentioned above).
However, even in the later cases when the distractor is an
irrelevant-feature singleton, the attentional-capture paradigm re-
mains limited with respect to addressing determinants of distrac-
tion by stimuli that are entirely irrelevant to the task because the
singleton location is typically task relevant. As the target may
potentially appear in the singleton location or, in other cases (e.g.,
Peterson, Kramer, & Irwin, 2004; Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, Irwin,
& Zelinsky, 1999), as the singleton is presented in a location that
is perceptually grouped with the other search items’ locations (e.g.,
they are all presented as part of one circle), participants in fact
have to include this location in their search for the target. Notice
that in recent temporal versions of the attentional-capture para-
digm either the singleton distractor’s location is relevant to the
temporal search, as it is presented in the same stream as the target
(Dalton & Lavie, 2004), or else, if the distractor is presented in a
different stream or flanking the relevant stream stimuli, it is found
to interfere only when distractor feature dimensions (e.g., color),
are in fact relevant to the search target (Folk, Leber, & Egeth,
2002; Folk & Remington, 2006).
In conclusion, the existing distractor tasks do not address the
important issue of what determines distraction by stimuli that are
entirely irrelevant to the task at hand as they bear no response or
feature relevance to the task stimuli, and appear in an irrelevant
location. The purpose of the present study was therefore to estab-
lish a new distractor paradigm in which, as often is the case in
daily life, the distractor stimuli may attract attention despite being
entirely irrelevant to the task. To that purpose we asked partic-
ipants to perform a letter-search task and indicate whether the
target letter X or N has appeared in the search display. On 10%
of the trials an entirely task-irrelevant distractor appeared in the
periphery.
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tractors that are entirely irrelevant to the task at hand we selected
stimuli with attributes that previous research suggest to be partic-
ularly attention capturing. In this sense our measure of distraction
is also akin to distraction in daily life, whereby the source of
distraction is often more attractive to attention than the stimuli
relevant for the current task (e.g., in the aforementioned examples
of distraction during driving or during office work, the billboards
are often more attractive than the stimuli relevant for the driving
task, such as the state of the road, and the actions of a colleague
nearby may appear more attractive than office tasks such as word
processing and number crunching). We therefore presented mean-
ingful and colorful pictures of famous figures (e.g., “Spider-Man”)
that are likely to be familiar to all subjects and are clearly more
salient (and hence likely to capture attention; see Theeuwes, 1991,
1992, 2004; Yantis & Egeth, 1999) than the monochromatic search
letters in the relevant task. These were presented on a low fre-
quency of trials again to make the distraction more akin to daily
life. The cost associated with distraction by these irrelevant dis-
tractors was measured by a comparison of the search RTs in the
presence versus the absence of an irrelevant distractor.
A second aim of the study was to investigate whether distraction
by entirely irrelevant stimuli is determined by the same factors as
those that that were found to determine distraction in previous
distractor paradigms. We focused on the role of perceptual load as
prescribed by the Load Theory of attention (Lavie, 1995; Lavie,
Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Lavie & Tsal, 1994), as many
studies have highlighted the level of perceptual load in a relevant
task as a major determinant of the extent to which irrelevant
stimuli are distracting (see Lavie, 2005 for review).
In the Load Theory perception is a capacity-limited process that
proceeds in an automatic manner on all stimuli within its capacity.
Thus perception of stimuli that are currently task irrelevant and can
potentially be distracting cannot be voluntarily withheld. In tasks
that involve only low levels of perceptual load (e.g., requiring the
detection of just one stimulus) any spare capacity not taken up by
the perception of task-relevant stimuli involuntarily “spills over”
to the perception of task-irrelevant distractors. Distractor process-
ing is, however, prevented in tasks of high perceptual load (e.g.,
tasks requiring complex perceptual discriminations or involving
many relevant stimuli) as a natural consequence of the tasks
exhausting all or most of the perceptual capacity in the processing
of task-relevant stimuli, leaving little or none for any irrelevant-
distractor processing.
Evidence in support of Load Theory has been obtained in many
studies using both behavioral (e.g., Cartwright-Finch & Lavie,
2006; Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie & Fox, 2000) and
neuroimaging methods (e.g., Bishop, Jenkins, & Lawrence, 2006;
Pinsk, Doniger, & Kastner, 2004; Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 1997;
Schwartz et al., 2005; Yi, Woodman, Widders, Marois, & Chun,
2004). The results of these studies converged to show that distrac-
tor processing and related brain activity are determined by the
level of perceptual load in the task in the manner predicted by the
Load Theory.
Load Theory has promising applied implications, both for pre-
dicting in which situations individuals will be most susceptible to
distraction (i.e., during the performance of perceptually unde-
manding tasks) and potentially for devising methods to aid the
avoidance of distractor interference (by increasing the tasks’ per-
ceptual demands). As yet, however, it is unknown whether increas-
ing perceptual load will eliminate interference from distractors that
cause interference despite being entirely irrelevant to the task.
Interference by such distractors may not be modulated by percep-
tual load, as it is possible that stimuli capable of capturing attention
despite task irrelevance would be the kind of “special” stimuli to
override the effects of perceptual load. Indeed, previous research
has demonstrated that the interference from task-relevant
(response-competing) distractors that are in some way more spe-
cial (e.g., famous faces) was not modulated by the level of per-
ceptual load in the task (Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003).
We thus varied the level of perceptual load in the letter-search
task. Similarly to previous perceptual-load studies (e.g., Lavie &
Cox, 1997) participants either searched for an X or N target among
small Os (low perceptual load) or among other similar angular
letters (H, K, M, Z, W, V, high perceptual load). In addition we
have presented a compatible or incompatible distractor letter on
80% of the trials (the irrelevant-distractor picture was presented on
10% of the trials, and no distractor was presented on the remaining
10% of the trials, Experiments 1–2). The previous behavioral
perceptual-load tasks used various measures of distractor process-
ing in establishing the effects of perceptual load on distractor
processing (e.g., negative priming: Lavie & Fox, 2000; recognition
memory: Jenkins, Lavie, & Driver, 2005; measures of explicit
awareness in inattentional blindness and change blindness para-
digms: Beck, Muggleton, Walsh, & Lavie, 2006; Cartwright-Finch
& Lavie, 2006; Lavie, 2006), but the flanker task is perhaps the
most widely used behavioral measure of distractor processing both
in the perceptual-load studies (e.g., Beck & Lavie, 2005; Lavie,
1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie, Ro, & Russell, 2003) and in
selective attention studies in general (see Lavie & Tsal, 1994 for
review).
The incorporation of the flanker distractor letters into our task
allowed us to ensure that the effects of perceptual load on distrac-
tor processing were replicable in our new paradigm. Such repli-
cation seemed particularly important in light of the possibility that
interference by the irrelevant but meaningful distractor may not be
modulated by perceptual load.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Sixteen participants (12 females) aged between
18 and 35 (M  22), with normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
were recruited from the University College London subject pool
and paid for participation.
Stimuli and procedure. The experiment was programmed and
run with the use of E-Prime. All stimuli were presented on a 15-in.
computer screen at a viewing distance of 60 cm. Each trial began
with a centrally presented fixation point for 500 ms, followed
immediately by the stimulus display, which remained onscreen
until response. The stimulus display consisted of a centrally pre-
sented 1.6° radius circle of six letters (each subtending 0.6° by
0.4°). In each trial the participants were required to search the
letter circle for a target letter (either X or N) and respond using the
numerical keypad by pressing the 0 key if the target was an X and
the 2 key if the target was an N. In the high-load condition the
nontarget letters in the circle were five angular letters (selected at
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circle, and in the low load the nontarget letters were all small Os
(0.15°).
On 80% of the trials a distractor letter (0.8° by 0.5°) was
presented to the left or right of the circle, 1.4° from the nearest
circle letter. This distractor letter was equally likely to be an X or
an N, and equally likely to be the same as (congruent condition) or
different from (incongruent condition) the target. All stimuli were
presented on a black background and all letter stimuli were gray.
On 10% of the trials (irrelevant-distractor condition) a cartoon
character (Pikachu from the Poke ´mon cartoon, Mickey Mouse,
Donald Duck, Spongebob Squarepants, Superman or Spider-Man),
subtending 2.8° to 4° vertically by 2.8 to 3.2° horizontally, was
presented in full color, either above or below the letter circle (with
its center at 4.6° from fixation, and between 0.6° and 1° edge to
edge from the nearest circle letter)—see Figure 1 for a sample
stimulus display with the irrelevant distractor. Note that, in order
to avoid the task-irrelevant distractors acquiring some relevance
through their location also being associated with task-relevant
distractors, in all experiments the two types of distractors were
presented in these separate locations, with irrelevant distractors
presented above or below the central search display, and the
task-relevant distractors presented to the left or right. On the
remaining 10% trials no distractor was presented. Participants
were instructed to respond as quickly as they could while being
accurate and were emphatically instructed to look only at the letter
circle and ignore any additional stimuli that might appear outside
the circle. A short beep sounded on incorrect responses.
Participants completed three slow example trials and 12 practice
trials for each level of load. The practice trials included only the
congruent and incongruent conditions and participants were not
informed that cartoon characters would be appearing during the
experiment. Participants then completed four low-load and four
high-load blocks of 60 trials in the order either ABBAABBA or
BAABBAAB (counterbalanced between participants). All combi-
nations of load, target position, target identity, distractor condition,
and distractor identity were fully counterbalanced for both the
high-frequency (congruent or incongruent) and the low-frequency
trials (irrelevant-distractor and no-distractor conditions).
Results and Discussion
Response times. Response times longer than 2 s were consid-
ered outliers and excluded from the analyses. This led to excluding
0.2% of the low-load trials and 3.1% of the high-load trials. In
order to reduce noise from guessed responses, inaccurate responses
were also excluded from the RT analyses. The mean RTs in this
experiment as well in Experiment 2 were calculated as a function
of load and distractor condition and then entered into two 2  2
within-subject ANOVAs, one with the factors of load (low, high)
and distractor congruency (incongruent, congruent) and the other
with the factor of load (low, high) and irrelevant-distractor condi-
tion (irrelevant distractor, no distractor). Table 1 presents the mean
results in the different experimental conditions.
The load  distractor-congruency ANOVA revealed a main
effect for load, F(1,15)  154.51, MSE  7,791.44, p  .001,
p
2  .91. RTs were longer in the high-load than in the low-load
conditions, confirming that the perceptual-load manipulation was
effective in increasing the task difficulty. There was also a main
effect for the distractor congruency, F(1,15)  4.41, MSE 
882.91, p  .053, p
2  .23, that was qualified by an interaction of
load and distractor congruency, F(1,15)  5.19, MSE  1,237.37,
p  .038, p
2  .26. This interaction indicated that high perceptual
load eliminated distractor-congruency effects: The distractor-
congruency effects were significant only in the low-load condition
[M  36 ms, t(15)  4.18, SEM  8.51, p  .001, d  2.16] and
not in the high-load condition (M  4, t  1), thus replicating
the effect of perceptual load on distractor processing established in
previous research (e.g., Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997; see
Lavie, 2005, for review).
The ANOVA with the factors of load and irrelevant-distractor
conditions revealed main effects for load, F(1,15)  107.73,
MSE  12,927.06, p  .001, p
2  .88, and for the irrelevant-
distractor condition, F(1,15)  11.05, MSE  3,336.68, p  .005,
p
2  .42, but no interaction of load and irrelevant-distractor
condition, F  1. As can be seen in Table 1, RTs were longer in
the presence of an irrelevant distractor than in the no-distractor
conditions in both conditions of load. The contrast between the
modulation of interference from the response-related distractor
letter by load and the lack of modulation of interference from the
irrelevant distractor is potentially important in indicating boundary
conditions for load effects on distractor processing and may be due
to a number of factors that could have made the irrelevant distrac-
tor interfering regardless of load, for example, its rarity, meaning-
fulness, superfamiliarity, and so forth (see also Lavie et al., 2003).
We further address this issue in the following experiments. For
Figure 1. An example stimulus display (not to scale) with an irrelevant
distractor in the low load (set size 1) condition. Note that the specific
cartoon image shown here as an irrelevant distractor is included for
illustrative purposes only, in order to avoid violating copyright for the
images used in the experiment (these were Spongebob Squarepants, Su-
perman, Spider-Man, Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck, and Pikachu from the
Poke ´mon cartoon).
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the disruptive effects of an entirely task-irrelevant distractor.
Moreover, as can be seen in Table 1, RTs in the presence of an
irrelevant distractor in the low-load condition were just as slow as
RTs in the presence of a response-incongruent distractor, even
though the irrelevant distractor was not associated with any re-
sponse. Thus clearly this type of irrelevant distractor can distract
people even though it appears in an irrelevant location and is
entirely irrelevant to the task, not sharing any target stimulus
characteristics and not being associated with any of the task
responses. Note, however, that by pointing to the similar magni-
tude of interference effects from the irrelevant distractors and the
response-competition distractors we do not intend to make a direct
comparison of these very different distractor stimuli. Our intention
here is simply to point out that it is possible for some forms of
task-irrelevant distractors to produce robust interference effects
that can be of a similar magnitude to those produced by response-
incompatible distractors.
Errors. A load  distractor-congruency ANOVA on the per-
centage error rates revealed a main effect of congruency,
F(1,15)  6.36, MSE  7.16, p  .023, p
2  .30, reflecting
increased error rates in the incongruent distractor condition. There
were no further effects on the error measure (all Fs 1).
Experiment 2
In Experiments 2(a) and 2(b) we sought to rule out an important
alternative account for the interpretation of the results from Ex-
periment 1 in terms of eye movements instead of attention. Al-
though orienting attention to a distractor is likely to also involve an
eye movement (e.g., Kramer, Irwin, Theeuwes, & Hahn, 1999;
Peterson et al., 2004; Theeuwes et al., 1999), it is important to
establish that our measure of distractor cost to task performance
does not merely reflect the cost due to an eye movement, but is
instead due to the distraction of attention from focusing on the
task. In other words, as the long exposure durations used in
Experiment 1 allowed for eye movements, the RT cost associated
with the distractor presence does not necessarily reflect any atten-
tional effect but simply the time it took to move the eyes to the
distractor and back to the task stimuli. In the following experi-
ments we therefore used brief exposure durations (100 ms) of the
task stimuli that preclude the possibility of eye movements to the
distractor before completion of the search task. In this way any
costs seen on the task RTs clearly reflect a cost due to diversion of
attention rather than a cost due to the time it takes to make an eye
movement to the distractor.
In daily life it is often the case that whereas the task one
performs involves some time pressure, the distracting stimulus
(e.g., a person appearing at your door) is present for a duration that
may appear unlimited! In Experiment 2(a) we therefore attempted
to examine distractibility in such situations by presenting the task
stimuli for a brief duration (100 ms) but exposing the irrelevant
distractor until response. Importantly, as the task stimuli were
presented for a duration that is too brief to allow for an eye
movement, any cost due to the distractor presence in Experiment
2(a) as well as in all the following experiments would reflect
attention being distracted from focusing on the task rather than a
cost due to an eye movement.
Once again we asked in Experiments 2(a) and 2(b) whether the
effects of irrelevant distraction on attention to the task target can
be modulated by increasing the level of perceptual load in the task.
Method
Participants. Sixteen participants (10 females) aged between
18 and 31 (M  21) participated in Experiment 2(a); and 16
participants (8 females) aged between 19 and 27 (M  22) par-
ticipated in Experiment 2(b). All participants were recruited from
the University College London subject pool, had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, and were paid for their participation.
Stimuli and procedure. The stimuli and procedure were iden-
tical to that of Experiment 1, with the following exceptions: For
both experiments the target, nontarget, and distractor-letter stimuli
were displayed for only 100 ms. A 2-s time window was allowed
for responses, after which a beep was heard. In Experiment 2(a)
the irrelevant distractor was displayed until response (as in Exper-
iment 1), whereas in Experiment 2b the irrelevant distractor was
displayed only for 100 ms.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary inspection of the data (presented in Table 2) re-
vealed a similar pattern of results in Experiments 2(a) and 2(b),
and their results are therefore described together.
Response times. As in Experiment 1, the load  congruency
ANOVAs showed significant increases in RTs with high load [for
Experiment 2(a): F(1,15)  74.54, MSE  10,116.7, p  .001,
p
2  .83; for Experiment 2(b): F(1,15)  101.99, MSE  9,252.8,
p  .001, p
2  .87]. The main effect of distractor congruency was
significant in Experiment 2(b) [F(1,15)  7.02, MSE  851.19,
p  .018, p
2  .32], reflecting slowed responses in the presence
of the incongruent distractor, although it did not reach significance
in Experiment 2(a) [F(1,15)  1.77, MSE  657.25, p  .203,
p
2  .11]. More important was the finding that in both experi-
ments, distractor congruency interacted with load [for Experiment
2(a): F(1,15)  13.00, MSE  323.7, p  .003, p
2  .46; for
Experiment 2(b): F(1,15)  8.946, MSE  442.327, p  .009,
p
2  .37]. As can be seen in Table 2, similarly to Experiment 1,
this interaction reflected a significant distractor-congruency effect
in the low-load condition [for Experiment 2(a), M  25 ms,
t(15)  2.80, SEM  8.83, p  .013, d  1.45; for Experiment
2(b), M  35 ms, t(15)  3.71, SEM  9.45, p  .001, d  1.92],
Table 1
Experiment 1: Mean RTs (SE in parentheses) and Percentage
Error Rates as a Function of Distractor Condition and Load
Distractor condition
I C I–C ID ND ID–ND
Low load
RT (ms) 592 (17) 556 (14) 36 592 (16) 537 (17) 55
% Error 6 4 4 5
High load
RT (ms) 846 (30) 850 (31) 4 880 (33) 839 (37) 41
% Error 6 5 5 5
Note. I  incongruent distractor, C  congruent distractor, ID  irrel-
evant distractor, ND  no distractor.
77 PERCEPTUAL LOAD AND IRRELEVANT DISTRACTORSbut not in the high-load condition [for Experiment 2(a), M  7
ms, t(15)  1.15, SEM  6.68, p  .268, d  0.59; for
Experiment 2(b), M  4 ms, t  1].
The ANOVAs on load  irrelevant-distractor condition also
revealed main effects of load [for Experiment 2(a): F(1,15) 
49.82, MSE  887,585.38, p  .001, p
2  .77; for Experiment
2(b): F(1,15)  107.57, MSE  10,502.64, p  .001, p
2  .88],
and irrelevant-distractor condition [for Experiment 2(a): F(1,15) 
7.61, MSE  12,031.9, p  .015, p
2  .34; for Experiment 2(b):
F(1,15)  26.39, MSE  20,476.54, p  .001, p
2  .64], mir-
roring the effects observed in Experiment 1. However, in a contrast
to Experiment 1, there was also an interaction of load and
irrelevant-distractor condition [for Experiment 2(a): F(1,15) 
4.52, MSE  2,073.54, p  .051, p
2  .23; for Experiment 2(b):
F(1,15)  5.82, MSE  1,681.18, p  .029, p
2  .28]. This
interaction indicated that the significant RT cost due to the pres-
ence (vs. absence) of an irrelevant distractor in the low-load
condition [for Experiment 2(a): M  52 ms, t(15)  3.54, SEM 
14.58, p  .002, d  1.83; for Experiment 2(b): M  61 ms,
t(15)  8.18, SEM  7.4, p  .001, d  4.22] was eliminated with
high load (t  1 for the distractor effects with high load in both
experiments).
As can be seen in Table 2, with low perceptual load, RTs in the
presence of the irrelevant distractor were just as slow as in the
presence of the incongruent distractor (t  1 for their difference).
Errors. Load  congruency ANOVAs on percentage error
rates revealed a main effect of load [for Experiment 2(a):
F(1,15)  22.83, MSE  15.00, p  .001, p
2  .60; for Exper-
iment 2(b): F(1,15)  41.8, MSE  43.22, p  .001, p
2  .74],
reflecting less-accurate performance in the high-load condition. In
addition, there was a main effect of distractor congruency [for
Experiment 2(a): F(1,15)  7.67, MSE  1.00, p  .014, p
2 
.34; for Experiment 2(b): F(1,15)  5.23, MSE  8.08, p  .037,
p
2  .26], due to reduced accuracy in the incongruent-distractor
condition. The load  congruency interaction was not significant
[for Experiment 2(a): F(1,15)  3.88, MSE  1.00, p  .068,
p
2  .21; for Experiment 2(b): F(1,15)  3.2, MSE  7.06, p 
.094, p
2  .18] but showed a trend mirroring the RTs, with greater
performance costs due to incongruent distractors in the low-load
condition.
Load  irrelevant-distractor conditions ANOVAs on percentage
error rates revealed a main effect of load [for Experiment 2(a):
F(1,15)  39.41, MSE  6.00, p  .001, p
2  .72; for Experiment
2(b): F(1,15)  48.07, MSE  26.22, p  .001, p
2  .76],
reflecting a higher percentage of errors in the high-load condition.
No other effects on the error measure were significant [for the
main effect of distractor, F  1; for the load  distractor inter-
action for Experiment 2(a), F(1,15)  1.68, MSE  3.00, p 
.214, p
2  .10; for Experiment 2(b), F  1].
Between-experiments analyses. Mixed 2  2  2 ANOVAs
on RTs to correct trials and percentage errors, with the between-
subjects factor of experiment [2(a), 2(b)] and the within-subjects
factors of load (low, high) and congruency (incongruent, congru-
ent) revealed no interactions with experiment (all Fs 1 except for
the experiment and congruency RT interaction for which
F(1,30)  1.24, MSE  754.22, p  .275, p
2  .04).
Mixed 2  2  2 ANOVAs on RTs to correct trials and
percentage errors, with the between-subjects factor of experiment
[2(a), 2(b)] and the within-subjects factors of load (low, high) and
irrelevant-distractor condition (irrelevant distractor, no distractor)
revealed no interactions with experiment [all Fs  1, except for the
interaction of load and experiment in the error data for which
F(1,30)  2.35, MSE  44.83, p  .136, p
2  .07, and the
interaction of load, congruency, and experiment in the errors for
which F(1,30)  1.96, MSE  32.8, p  .172, p
2  .06]. These
between-experiment analyses confirmed that the results in Exper-
iments 2(a) and 2(b) were not statistically different.
As the results of Experiment 2(a) and 2(b) were very similar and
the design of Experiment 2(b) precluded an alternative account of
the results in terms of eye movements for the cost in performance
produced by the presence of a distractor, these experiments suggest
that the presence of an irrelevant distractor has distracted attention
from focusing on the task. Importantly, now that the task stimuli
were always exposed for a brief duration, the interference effects
Table 2
Experiment 2: Mean RTs (SE in Parentheses) and Percentage Error Rates as a Function of
Distractor Condition and Load
Distractor condition
I C I–C ID ND ID–ND
Experiment 2(a)
Low load
RT (ms) 576 (19) 551 (17) 25 581 (25) 529 (19) 52
% Error 9 5 7 7
High load
RT (ms) 777 (29) 784 (28) 7 792 (36) 789 (36) 3
% Error 16 16 21 18
Experiment 2(b)
Low load
RT (ms) 569 (20) 534 (14) 35 575 (19) 514 (15) 61
% Error 8 5 8 5.5
High load
RT (ms) 796 (30) 793 (28) 4 816 (34) 805 (33) 11
% Error 17 17 16 16
Note.I incongruent distractor, C  congruent distractor, ID  irrelevant distractor, ND  no distractor.
78 FORSTER AND LAVIEfrom the irrelevant distractor were eliminated with high perceptual
load in the task.
It is of particular interest to note that even the effects of the
prolonged distractors in Experiment 2(a) which, like many daily
life distractors, continued to be present for a longer period of time
than the 100-ms task presentation, were eliminated by high per-
ceptual load. This suggests that the time pressure of the task, but
not the duration of the distractor itself, affects the level of distrac-
tion.
Experiment 3
Experiments 2(a) and 2(b) demonstrated perceptual load mod-
ulation of the effects of both the irrelevant distractors and the
response-competing distractors. There are a number of ways, how-
ever, in which the inclusion of response-relevant distractors in the
paradigm might influence the processing of the task-irrelevant
distractor. For example, the need to reject the response-competing
distractors (as in some cases, when they were incongruent with the
target, these were clearly directly interfering with the task re-
sponse) may have motivated the subjects to make their best at-
tempt to ignore any distractors, including the task-irrelevant dis-
tractors. Thus the irrelevant-distractor interference effects seen in
the conditions of low perceptual load may have underestimated
their interference in circumstances when subjects may not be as
motivated to ignore irrelevant distractors. Conversely, the presence
of response-competition distractors may have increased the
irrelevant-distractor interference effects seen in the low-load con-
dition because of the demand on executive control made by the
rejection of the response-competition distractors, leaving executive
control less able to control also for the interference from the
irrelevant distractors.
It was therefore important to show that the interference from the
irrelevant distractors does not depend on the presence of response-
relevant distractors on the majority of the trials. Experiments 3 and
4 thus sought to establish the interference effects from irrelevant
distractors as well as the effects of perceptual load in a task
paradigm that does not include any response-relevant distractor.
Method
Participants. Sixteen participants (9 females) aged between 18
and 32 (M  21) were recruited from the University College
London subject pool and paid for their participation. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli and procedure. The stimuli and procedure were iden-
tical to that of Experiment 2(b), with the exception that there were
no incongruent or congruent letter distractors. An irrelevant-
picture distractor was displayed on 10% of the trials and no
distractor was displayed on the remaining 90% of trials.
Results and Discussion
The mean RTs in this experiment as well as in Experiment 4
were calculated as a function of load and distractor condition and
then entered into two 2  2 within-subject ANOVAs, with these
factors.
Response times. The RT ANOVA revealed a main effect of
load, F(1,15)  49.48, MSE  12,351.79, p  .001, p
2  .77, as
before responses were slower with high perceptual load. As in
Experiment 2, there was a significant main effect of irrelevant-
distractor condition, F(1,15)  26.42, MSE  945.02, p  .001,
p
2  .64, that was qualified by an interaction with load, F(1,15) 
6.84, MSE  947.19, p  .019, p
2  .31. Table 3 shows that this
interaction reflected, as before, that the significant RT cost due to
the presence (vs. absence) of the irrelevant distractor under low
perceptual load [M  60 ms, t(15)  7.61, SEM  7.84, p  .001,
d  3.93] was eliminated with high perceptual load [M  19,
t(15)  1.47, SEM  13.23, p  .164, d  0.75].
Errors. A load  irrelevant-distractor condition ANOVA re-
vealed a main effect of load, F(1,15)  26.82, MSE  65.38, p 
.001, p
2  .64, reflecting less accurate performance under high
perceptual load. There were no other significant effects on this
measure (all Fs 1).
Experiment 4
In Experiment 4 we sought to establish further the effect of
perceptual load on interference by the irrelevant distractors in a
design that rules out an important alternative account for the
results. One might claim that the change of the task from low load
to high load has also, by changing the availability of certain search
strategies, changed the relevance of the supposedly entirely irrel-
evant distractors to the attentional settings for the search task.
Recall that in the low-load conditions participants searched for an
angular target letter among curved nontarget letters. The target
letter therefore had a unique angular feature, and formed a single-
ton in the low-load conditions. In the high-load conditions the
nontargets were also angular, and so the angular target was no
longer a unique singleton.
One might claim, then, that although the subjects had to search
for the specific target features in the high-load condition, in the
low-load condition, rather than focusing on the specific angular
target features, the participants instead have adopted a general
search strategy whereby they simply look for any singleton in the
search array (a singleton-detection strategy; see Bacon & Egeth,
1994). Such a singleton-detection search strategy would allow the
subject to detect the singleton target in the low-load condition but,
as the irrelevant distractor was also a singleton (the cartoon image
was the only one in the display of its kind), the use of a singleton-
detection strategy in the low-load task may have increased the
relevance of the distractor to the attentional settings used in the
low-load (but not high load) task. In other words, if the participants
Table 3
Experiment 3: Mean RTs (SE in Parentheses) and Percentage
Error Rates as a Function of Distractor Condition and Load
Distractor condition
ID ND ID–ND
Low load
RT (ms) 538 (16) 478 (12) 60
% Error 10 7
High load
RT (ms) 713 (41) 694 (33) 19
% Error 19 19
Note. ID  irrelevant distractor, ND  no distractor.
79 PERCEPTUAL LOAD AND IRRELEVANT DISTRACTORSengaged in a singleton-detection search mode in the low-load
condition they may have been more likely to detect the distractor
by virtue of being tuned to detect any odd singleton item in this
condition.
It was therefore important to establish that both the distractor
interference effects found under low load and their elimination
under high load did not depend on the use of a singleton-detection
strategy in the low- but not high-load condition. To prevent the use
of a singleton-detection strategy in the low-load condition of
Experiment 4 we replaced two of the Os in the low-load displays
with two, angular nontarget letters (from the set H, K, M, Z, W, V).
A search set size of three target letters should not impose sufficient
perceptual load to exhaust full capacity (this is typically exhausted
with five items or more, e.g., Fisher, 1982; Kahneman, Treisman,
& Gibbs, 1992; Pylyshyn et al., 1994; Yantis & Jones, 1991) and
therefore should still be open to the processing of an additional
irrelevant distractor (Lavie & Cox, 1997), but in the presence of
two other angular letters the target is no longer a singleton. Thus
a singleton target detection strategy would no longer be available
with the addition of two angular letters to the search display in the
low-load condition.
In addition, the previous experiments varied the level of per-
ceptual load between different blocks of trials. Such a blocked
design may be open to alternative accounts in terms of different
expectations prior to each of the load conditions, and therefore
different levels of motivation used in the different conditions of
load. For example, the participants may have anticipated that the
task would be harder in the high-load condition and thus been
more motivated to ignore irrelevant distractors in the high-load
compared to the low-load blocks. If this were the case then one
might attribute the reduced distraction to the greater motivation
instead of the higher perceptual load in those blocks. In order to
further rule out such an alternative account of the load effects in
terms of differences in expectations between the low- and high-
load conditions we varied the level of perceptual load at random
between different trials of the same block in Experiment 4. In this
way the participants could not have anticipated or prepared for the
level of perceptual load that would be presented on each trial. Thus
any effects found could not be attributed to a change in the
anticipated level of task load and any potential change in the
participants’ motivation.
Method
Participants. Sixteen participants (6 males) aged between 19
and 29 (M  25), and with normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
were recruited from the University College London Psychology
Subject Pool and paid for their participation.
Stimuli and procedure. The stimuli in the high-load condition
were identical to those in Experiment 3. In low-load condition the
target letter was presented with three small Os (0.15°) and two
angular nontarget letters of the same dimensions as the target
(from the set H, K, Z, W, V, M). The target X or N always
appeared next to the angular nontarget letters and the three angular
letters (the target and two nontargets) were equally likely to appear
in each of the three possible arrangements (target between the two
nontargets, target to the left of both nontargets, target to the right
of both nontargets). The procedure was similar to that of Experi-
ment 3, with the following exceptions: The conditions of load were
mixed within each block of 60 trials. In addition, the irrelevant
distractor was displayed on 20% of the trials and no distractor was
displayed on the remaining 80% of trials. For the no-distractor
trials, target identity, target position, load, and their combinations
were counterbalanced within each block. For the irrelevant-
distractor trials, target identity and position, distractor identity and
position, load, and their combinations were fully counterbalanced
between blocks. Participants performed 12 slow example trials and
24 practice trials, followed by eight experimental blocks.
Results and Discussion
Response times. The 2  2 within-subjects ANOVA revealed
significant main effects of load, F(1,15)  34.12, MSE  2,464.5,
p  .001, p
2  .70, and irrelevant-distractor condition, F(1,15) 
6.59, MSE  541.33, p  .021, p
2  .31. As in Experiments 2 and
3, there was also a significant interaction between load and
irrelevant-distractor condition, F(1,15)  7.79, MSE  186.53,
p  .014, p
2  .34, as can be seen in Table 4. This interaction
indicated as before that the significant RT cost due to the presence
(vs. absence) of the irrelevant distractor under low perceptual load
[M  25 ms, t(15)  4.93, SEM  4.97, p  .001, d  2.55] was
eliminated with high perceptual load (M  6 ms, t  1).
Errors. A load  irrelevant-distractor condition ANOVA re-
vealed only a main effect of load, F(1,15)  45.27, MSE  41.56,
p  .001, p
2  .75, reflecting less accurate performance under
high perceptual load (all other Fs  1).
General Discussion
The present experiments established a new laboratory measure
of distractor interference from an entirely irrelevant distractor.
Unlike the most commonly used measures of distractor interfer-
ence, the response-competition and attentional-capture paradigms,
the irrelevant distractors used here were entirely irrelevant to the
task. Not only did the irrelevant cartoon images bear no association
with any of the task responses (cf. the response-competition par-
adigm) but also they were presented in an irrelevant remote loca-
tion outside of the search array. Yet they produced interference on
the current task that was of equal magnitude to that from the
response-competing distractor letters. The results of Experiment 4
further clarified that the interference from the irrelevant distractors
cannot be attributed to a singleton-detection search strategy, as
they persist even when searching for a nonsingleton target.
Table 4
Experiment 4: Mean RTs (SE in Parentheses) and Percentage
Error Rates as a Function of Distractor Condition and Load
Distractor condition
ID ND ID–ND
Low load
RT (ms) 740 (16) 715 (28) 25
% Error 9 9
High load
RT (ms) 803 (37) 797 (37) 6
% Error 20 20
Note.I D  irrelevant distractor, ND  no distractor.
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demonstrating interference from interruptions that clearly require
no response (as participants were instructed to ignore all material
other than the search set). Thus our new measure of interference
from an entirely irrelevant distractor in the present study appears to
be more akin to the daily life experience of being distracted by a
stimulus that is entirely unrelated to the task at hand and clearly
requires no response, as in the examples discussed in the intro-
duction of distraction by colleagues in the work environment and
by billboards during driving.
The second key finding of the present study concerned the
effect of perceptual load on the interference by irrelevant dis-
tractors. Perceptual load has previously been shown to modu-
late distractor processing under a wide range of paradigms (see
Lavie, 2005 for review). The present study extends previous
research first in showing that the interference by distractor
stimuli that are competing with the current task response can be
eliminated with high perceptual load even when both the task
stimuli and the distractors are presented until response. Second,
the present study demonstrates that perceptual load can also
eliminate the rather sizable interference effects produced by the
irrelevant-distractor cartoons as long as there is time pressure
on the task performance and the stimulus durations preclude eye
movements (cf. Experiment 1). Moreover, Experiment 4 ruled
out alternative explanations of the perceptual-load effects in
terms of a difference in the search strategy employed in the
high- and low-load condition, as both levels of load required the
participant to search for the distractor among other angular
letters and the level of load in each trial was unpredictable.
As the irrelevant distractors we have used were images of
famous cartoon figures, the finding that high perceptual load
eliminates their interference might at first sight appear to con-
flict with the previous finding (Lavie et al., 2003) that the
interference effects that famous distractor faces (of pop stars or
politicians) produce are not modulated by perceptual load.
However, the distractor faces in Lavie et al. (2003) were asso-
ciated with the task responses (participants classified pop stars
and politicians’ names while their faces were presented as
distractors) and their interference effects were measured
through the response-competition effects produced by incon-
gruent (e.g., Elvis Presley’s face presented with Bill Clinton’s
name) compared to congruent (e.g., Elvis Presley’s face pre-
sented with his own name) distractor faces. It therefore remains
possible that the interference from the irrelevant cartoon dis-
tractors of the present study would be unaffected by perceptual
load if they became task relevant (e.g., if the task involved
classification of their names).
In the present study, in order to examine whether stimuli entirely
irrelevant to the task at hand could, nevertheless, be distracting, we
elected to use distractors with characteristics (visual salience,
meaningfulness) that previous research suggests to be highly dis-
tracting. Future research should establish the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for interference by distractors that are entirely
irrelevant to the task (e.g., would the distracting effects persist
even when the irrelevant distractors were meaningless and dis-
played on a greater percentage of trials? Would irrelevant distrac-
tors produce greater interference effects if presented in another
modality to the task stimuli? Can task-irrelevant distractors pro-
duce interference even if they are of equal or lower salience
relative to the task stimuli?). Such research is currently under way
in our lab.
Finally, the present research has promising practical implica-
tions for determining the situations in which people are particu-
larly susceptible to distraction in daily life. The results of Exper-
iment 1 suggest that when there is no time pressure on a task
currently being performed, individuals may remain susceptible to
distraction from salient yet irrelevant distractors, regardless of the
perceptual demands of the task they are performing. On the other
hand, the results of Experiments 2–4 suggest that when there is
time pressure on a task being performed, people are less likely to
become distracted [even, as the results of Experiment 2(a) would
suggest, by the prolonged presence of a distractor] if their task has
a high level of perceptual load.
These findings would thus predict that drivers may be less
susceptible to distraction from salient billboards while weaving in
and out of heavy traffic (high perceptual load) than when driving
along an empty motorway (low perceptual load). For work envi-
ronments the findings would suggest that the design of some tasks
may benefit from involving higher perceptual load so that employ-
ees would be less distracted by task-irrelevant stimuli.
In addition to these apparently beneficial effects of perceptual
load, future research may also examine the effect of increased
perceptual load in contexts within which reduced awareness of
distractors would not be beneficial. For example, although people
may better ignore irrelevant distractors in tasks of high perceptual
load they may also be less able to disengage from the task and
make a response to a relevant interruption in such tasks. Thus, in
cases where effective interruption management is likely to require
a swift response it may prove beneficial to minimize the level of
perceptual load in the task involved. Overall, the present research
highlights the importance of considering the interference effects of
distractors that are entirely task irrelevant and the role of percep-
tual load in determining such distraction.
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